l'occasion de son passage à Lisbonne, à la Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian, pour la conférence "Peuples Exposés", intégrée dans le cycle de conférences A Républica por vir – arte, política e pensamento para o século XXI 1 (La République à venir – art, politique et pensée pour le XXIème siècle), nous avons rencontré Georges Didi-Huberman pour l'entretien qui suit, autour de son livre Remontages du temps Subi. L'oeil de l'histoire, 2 (Éditions de Minuit, 2010).

Problematizando o SER, o EU, o consciente e o inconscinte humano, do nascituro ao pós nascimento..-|||-Problematizing the BEING, the I, the conscious and the unconscious human, from the unborn child in the mother's womb to after birth.--|||--Problematizar el SER, el YO, el humano consciente e inconsciente, desde el feto en el vientre materno hasta después del nacimiento.----||||----TÍTULO: ---PELA CIENTIFICIDADE FRENTE AS PSEUDOCIÊNCIAS ROMÂNTICAS, MÍTICAS E DE CRENÇAS NA CONCEPÇÃO DO EU, DO CONSCIENTE E INCONSCIENTE DOS NASCITUROS E RECÉM-NASCIDOS.---||||----TITLE: ----FOR (...) SCIENTIFITY IN THE FACE OF ROMANTIC AND MYTHICAL PSEUDOSCIENCE AND BELIEFS IN THE CONCEPTION OF THE "I", OF THE CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS OF THE UNBORN AND NEWBORN. -----||||---TÍTULO: ---POR LA CIENTIFICIDAD FRENTE A LAS PSEUDOCIENCIAS Y CREENCIAS ROMÁNTICAS Y MÍTICAS EN LA CONCEPCIÓN DEL YO, DEL CONSCIENTE Y DEL INCONSCIENTE DEL NO NACIDO Y DEL RECIÉN NACIDO--|||---RESUMO: Quando surge o EU do SER, no nascituro ou no recém-nascido? Há diferenças entre o EU desse SER nos dois momentos, vivencias, experiencias e movimentos distintos? No útero materno e ou após o nascimento? E o que dizer sobre a questão da consciência e inconsciência desse SER e EU simultaneamente? Há consciência e inconsciência? Apenas uma delas?! Nenhuma!? E se houver uma apenas ou as duas, elas estão ativas? São iguais no útero e após o nascimento? Podem mudar ou se modificarem? Poderíamos dizer sobre um EU, consciência e inconsciente antes de nascer e depois de nascer? Só existe um EU depois de sair do útero materno? Há apenas consciência e inconsciência após o nascimento do SER e EU? Estas são as questões que tentaremos trabalhar no ensaio em tela e suas problemáticas da atualidade. Importante informar que a noção e concepção consciente e inconsciente discutidas aqui não irão estar restritas aos aspectos moral, jurídico, religioso, formal, cultural e social, elas estarão na dimensão e pauta das áreas das neurociências, biofisiológicas, biopsíquicas e filosófica. Desse modo, realizaremos um trabalho de busca e resgate histórico do Eu, do Consciente e Inconsciente da espécie humana, no qual produções como as de Freud serão nossa base inicial e de discussões críticas quanto ao que vem sendo confeccionado sobre a história e atuação dessas esferas psíquicas da humanidade. Sendo assim, realizaremos um movimento de historiografia desses componentes da psiquê, situando-os no tempo e espaço histórico, geográfico, cultural, corporal e mental. Palavras-chave: Ciência; Pseudociências; nascituros.----||||||-----ABSTRACT: When does the I of BEING arise, in the unborn or the newborn? Are there differences between the I of this BEING in the two distinct moments, experiences, and movements? In the womb or after birth? And what about the question of consciousness and unconsciousness of this BEING and I simultaneously? Is there consciousness and unconsciousness? Only one of them? None? And if there is only one or both, are they active? Are they the same in the womb and after birth? Can they change or modify each other? Could we say about an I, consciousness and unconscious before birth and after birth? Is there only an I after leaving the mother's womb? Is there only consciousness and unconsciousness after the BEING and I are born? These are the questions that we will try to work on in this essay and its current problems. It is important to inform that the notion and conception of conscious and unconscious discussed here will not be restricted to moral, juridical, religious, formal, cultural and social aspects, they will be in the dimension and agenda of the neuroscience, biophysiological, biopsychic and philosophical areas. In this way, we will carry out a historical search and rescue work of the "I", the Conscious and the Unconscious of the human species, in which productions such as those of Freud initial base and of critical discussions about what has been done about the history and performance of these psychic spheres of humanity. Thus, we will carry out a historiographical movement of these components of the psyches, situating them in historical, geographic, cultural, biological, body and mental time and space.------|||||-----RESUMEN: ¿Cuándo surge el YO del SER, en el feto o en el recién nacido? ¿Existen diferencias entre el YO de este SER en los dos momentos, diferentes vivencias, vivencias y movimientos? ¿En el útero de la madre y/o después del nacimiento? ¿Y qué podemos decir del tema de la consciencia e inconsciencia de este SER y YO simultáneamente? ¿Existe conciencia e inconsciencia? ¡¿Solo uno de ellos?! ¿¡Ninguno!? Y si solo hay uno o ambos, ¿están activos? ¿Son iguales en el útero y después del nacimiento? ¿Pueden cambiar o modificarse? ¿Podríamos decir sobre un YO, la conciencia y la inconsciencia antes del nacimiento y después del nacimiento? ¿Existe un solo YO después de salir del útero materno? ¿Existe sólo consciencia e inconsciencia después del nacimiento del SER y del YO? Estas son las cuestiones que intentaremos trabajar en el ensayo que nos ocupa y sus problemáticas actuales. Es importante informar que la noción y concepción consciente e inconsciente aquí discutida no se restringirá a los aspectos morales, legales, religiosos, formales, culturales y sociales, estarán en la dimensión y agenda de las áreas de las neurociencias, biofisiológicas, biopsíquico y filosófico. De esta manera, realizaremos un trabajo de búsqueda y rescate histórico del Yo, el Consciente y el Inconsciente de la especie humana, en el que producciones como las de Freud serán nuestra base inicial y discusiones críticas respecto de lo creado sobre la historia y el desempeño de estas esferas psíquicas de la humanidad. Por ello, realizaremos un movimiento de historiografía de estos componentes de la psique, ubicándolos en el tiempo y el espacio histórico, geográfico, cultural, corporal y mental. Palabras clave: Ciencia; Pseudociencias; Yo-I; consciente; niños inconscientes y no nacidos. (shrink)

The paper proposes a novel understanding of how Aristotle’s theoretical works complement each other in such a way as to form a genuine system, and this with the immediate (and ostensibly central) aim of addressing a longstanding question regarding Aristotle’s ‘first philosophy’—namely, is Aristotle’s first philosophy a contribution to theology, or to the science of being in general? Aristotle himself seems to suggest that it is in some ways both, but how this can be is a very difficult question. My (...) answer is in some respects a version of one that goes back at least to the middle ages—i.e., that first philosophy is concerned with the gods (and to that extent offers a theology) because the gods are causes and principles of beings precisely insofar as they are beings. The more original aspect of my position lies in my claim that the sort of tension found in the Metaphysics is likewise to be found in many of Aristotle’s physical works. Thus, for example, the De caelo is (I argue) concerned generally with natural beings (= beings susceptible of change), but its discussions are focused largely on the heavenly bodies and the Aristotelian elements insofar as they admit of change with respect to place. Here I claim that the particular objects of discussion are dealt with precisely because they are causes and principles of natural beings as such. Something similar goes, I claim, for the De generatione et corruptione, the general concern of which is a particular species of natural being—i.e., natural beings susceptible of generation and corruption. In this way, I argue, Aristotle successively deals in his theoretical works with those causes and principles of (say) a horse which attach to it insofar as it is a being, those causes and principles of a horse which attach to it insofar as it is a natural being, those causes and principles of a horse which attach to it insofar as it is a perishable natural being, and so on for the lower genera under which the species horse is subsumed. (shrink)

According to Margaret Wilson, Leibniz is inconsistent when it comes to the question of whether one can have distinct ideas of sensible qualities, and this because he sometimes conceives of sensible qualities as sensations and sometimes conceives of them as complexes of primary qualities. When he conceives of them as sensations, he denies that we can have distinct ideas of sensible qualities; when he conceives of them as complexes of primary qualities, he asserts that we can. In this paper I (...) argue that Wilson is wrong to think that Leibnizian ideas admit of various degrees of confusion or distinctness. I also argue that although Wilson's problem admits of being reformulated in a manner consistent with a correct understanding of Leibnizian perceptions and ideas, this reformulated version of the problem admits to a satisfactory interpretive solution. (shrink)

A number of recent studies have called into question the traditional interpretation of Leibniz as an idealist beginning, at the latest, with the composition of the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686). In particular, in a recent book Daniel Garber affirms that between the late 1670s and late 1690s Leibniz maintains a realist doctrine according to which the created world is populated with extended corporeal substances. In trying to prove his thesis, Garber appeals to a document written in 1690 where Leibniz, addressing (...) an objection by Michelangelo Fardella, denies that bodies are composed of souls, declares that souls are substantial forms, and affirms that bodies are composed instead of substances. According to Garber, this shows that Leibniz then believed that bodies were composed, not of simple substances, but of extended substances possessing souls. Here I try to show that, to the contrary, the mentioned document (along with two others closely associated with it) support the traditional interpretation of Leibniz as an idealist in 1690. (shrink)

Abstract: The work at hand is an effort to expose and contextualize, the possible expressions of the first forms, modes and types of mystical, ritualistic, magical, sacrificial, belief and mythical manifestations in the social, cultural, economic, political and historical processes of societies. Thus verifying the first foundations, processes and biopsychosocial constructions, as well as their mystical and belief productions and reproductions. This is verified through and by peoples considered primitive, ancient and archaic. In this way, we will attempt a chronological (...) reconstruction of the formation and manifestation of the first mystical, magical, ritualistic and sacrificial practices throughout history, culminating in the formation of 'religions. Since it is precisely through the relationships between peoples, societies, cultures, civilizations and their cultural, mystical, mythical, ritualistic and belief anthropophagisms that other manifestations and possible 'religions' are produced. Thus, it is in the relationships and social interactions between them, integrating certain elements, contents, beliefs, etc. from each other, that the manifestations considered religious have emerged and spread to countless places. Therefore, these processes and manifestations have not remained static, but have changed and transformed throughout history up to the present day. And so Magic, Rituals, Myths, sacrifices and relationships with death have also been transformed and given new meanings. In the process, differentiations and transformations have produced certain dissonances, but also certain consonances or similarities. However, after the creation of religions and their relationship with the state, especially with the capitalist system, these dissonances are much more evident. We can also say that this work is perhaps a summary exposition of the unfolding of the 'evolutionary' processes of development, progress and multiproducts of the countless mystical, religious and cultural manifestations and their 'gods.' 'Evolutionary, progress and development' here refers only to the meanings and aspects of the creations, productions, re-elaborations and creative organizations of peoples, societies and/or civilizations, their cultures, mysticisms and beliefs. Above all, their deities, magic, rituals and gods. However, none are superior or lower. ||| Keywords: Mysticisms; Primitive; Rituals; Sacrifices; Historiography; Beliefs; Religions; Modernity; Capitalism; Death; Philosophy of History; Philosophy of Religion; Cultural Philosophy; Anthropology of Religions. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to offer a clear explanation of what monadic domination, understood as a relation obtaining exclusively among monads, amounts to in the philosophy of Leibniz (and this insofar as monadic domination is conceived by Leibniz not to account for the substantial unity of composite substances). Central to my account is the Aristotelian notion of a hierarchy of activities, as well as a particular understanding of the relations that obtain among the perceptions of monads that stand in (...) relations of monadic domination and subordination. (shrink)

In the second part of this essay, I aim to show that Leibniz, in asserting that bodies are aggregates of substances, wants to affirm something about bodies insofar as they exist a parte rei or in reality: in reality a body is not a being, but a multitude of beings or substances. And this, on my view, is precisely what leads Leibniz to assert that bodies are phenomena: since a body is not in reality a being, but many beings, it (...) follows that a body, conceived as a being, is something that exists only objectively in the soul. That is, a body, conceived as a single thing, is not something real, but an imaginary being, a creature of the mind, a phenomenon. (shrink)

Nuestro interés en el contenido mental no-conceptual es, principalmente, la articulación de una versión sustantiva (no-trivial) de esta clase de contenido en la experiencia perceptual. El debate acerca del contenido no-conceptual ha girado, en su mayor parte, alrededor de su existencia; y los argumentos que se han ofrecido en su favor abogan por una versión no sustantiva según la cual el contenido no-conceptual es aquel que no satisface ciertos requisitos conceptuales. Así, para desarrollar una versión sustantiva del contenido mental no-conceptual (...) hemos apelado a la versión de la experiencia perceptual de propiedades espaciales ofrecida por Evans (1982 cap. 6). A partir de esto desarrollamos un nuevo argumento a favor del contenido no-conceptual de la experiencia perceptual que lo vincula a la actividad característica de la experiencia perceptual. Por último, exponemos uno de los ataques de McDowell (1996) a la noción de contenido no-conceptual y presentamos nuestras réplicas a este ataque, mostrando su insuficiencia. Al mostrar que la crítica de McDowell no es exitosa, consideramos que podríamos tener una versión del contenido no-conceptual de la experiencia que es inmune a esta línea de argumentación. (shrink)

According to essentialism, metaphysical modality is founded in the essences of things, where the essence of a thing is roughly akin to its real definition. According to potentialism (also known as dispositionalism), metaphysical modality is founded in the potentialities of things, where a potentiality is roughly the generalized notion of a disposition. Essentialism and potentialism have much in common, but little has been written about their relation to each other. The aim of this paper is to understand better the relations (...) between essence and potentiality, on the one hand, and between essentialism and potentialism, on the other. It is argued, first, that essence and potentiality are not duals but interestingly linked by a weaker relation dubbed ‘semi-duality’; second, that given this weaker relation, essentialism and potentialism are not natural allies but rather natural competitors; and third, that the semi-duality of essence and potentiality allows the potentialist to respond to an important explanatory challenge by using essentialist resources without thereby committing to essentialism. (shrink)

A história humana possui seus processos e especificidades no e do tempo e espaço, com certas rupturas e continuidades de certos processos e elementos. Podemos citar como exemplo: Os tipos e modos de desigualdades, sistemas escravistas e sistemas coloniais etc. Mas, não sendo igual ou da mesma forma. Há especificidades e características ligadas ao tempo e ao espaço contextual. Porém, sem dúvidas, há acontecimentos e fatos históricos que ocorrem com certas semelhanças e características entre passado e presente, ainda que dentro (...) dos seus respectivos contextos. Logo, a cada época e contexto social, político, econômico, cultural, religioso e histórico, podemos observar certas semelhanças, entre ‘o ontem e o hoje. ’ A exemplo, o Sistema Feudal que ocorreu em muitos continentes e países, e em tempos específicos e com suas especificidades contextuais. Desse modo, como já mencionado, parecem que certos elementos ou resquícios de fatos históricos anteriores ou passados se evidenciam em outras épocas e contextos. Não que sejam os mesmos sistemas, nem tampouco a continuidade deles, mas apenas semelhanças e características que parecem ‘ir e vir. ’ Diante de tais fatos, seus problemas e consequências; debruçamo-nos em fontes sobre o Sistema Feudal Europeu dos séc. X ao XIV d. C. para compreendermos elementos, eventos e episódios que vêm ocorrendo na contemporaneidade brasileira, com algumas semelhanças com o Sistema Feudal. Fundamentalmente, no que diz respeito às terras, grandes latifundiários, religião, política, economia e rituais. Assim, identificamos que: a) Religião, Política e ‘poder’, tanto no feudalismo quanto nas relações políticas atuais no Brasil, continuam na perspectiva de defender a propriedade privada de grandes extensões de terras nas mãos de poucos; b) manter e reproduzir as ideias conservadoras e ‘moralistas’ dos grupos que detém o ‘poder político e econômico’; e c) naturalizar a pobreza e a miséria da população como destino ou normal-natural, bem como atribuir às conquistas econômicas e materiais dos grandes latifundiários a algo divino ou determinado. (shrink)

O presente trabalho1se dá diante da conjuntura política, econômica e social no Brasil, envolvendo a pandemia do COVID-19; além do aumento do sucateamento e precarização da estrutura e sistema educacional público. Para tanto, realizamos um processo de pesquisa empírico-qualitativa do cotidiano de uma equipe escolar e da comunidade que a cerca. Isto no que diz respeito ao enfrentamento dos obstáculos postos à educação pública, à pandemia, às reduções e cortes orçamentários da educação, além da própria desestruturação -em vários âmbitos e (...) aspectos -dos profissionais da educação. Inclusive, observamos e constatamos que esta equipe de profissionais estava sujeita a inúmeros riscos, solitária, quase invisível, resistindo e lutando por sonhos com uma comunidade. Isso de um fazer professoral, pedagógico e social que se encontravam esses profissionais, alguns adoecidos e em batalha para cumprir o exercício de sua profissão. Mesmo lhes custando a saúde e a vida, estes pareciam optar mais pela vida e pelos sonhos de uma comunidade melhor do que os deles. (shrink)

Contemporary Information Systems management incorporates the need to make explicit the links between semiotics, meaning-making and the digital age. This focus addresses, at its core, pure rationality, that is, the capacity of human interpretation and of human inscription upon reality. Creating the new real, that is the motto. Humans are intrinsically semiotic creatures. Consequently, semiotics is not a choice or an option but something that works like a second skin, establishing limits and permeable linkages between: human thought and human's infinite (...) world of imagination; and human action, with its correspondent infinite world of intentionality, of desire and of unexplored possibilities. Two instances are contrasted as two reading lenses of current business reality: IS governance and industry 4.0. These phenomena correspond to the need to take accountability, transparency and responsibility into account, when designing IS and when using such systems through the ecology of connectivity, Big Data and the Internet of Things. Political, social and cultural dimensions are brought into the equation, when addressing the question of the relevance and adequateness of IS theory and practice to respond to contemporary challenges. The message is that what has already been achieved is but a shadow, a pale vision, of what might be achieved in the age of the new Renaissance. (shrink)

Abilities are in many ways central to what being an agent means, and they are appealed to in philosophical accounts of a great many different phenomena. It is often assumed that abilities are some kind of dispositional property, but it is rarely made explicit exactly which dispositional properties are our abilities. Two recent debates provide two different answers to that question: the new dispositionalism in the debate about free will, and virtue reliabilism in epistemology. This paper argues that both answers (...) fail as general accounts of abilities, and discusses the ramifications of this result. (shrink)

I argue that the prime matter that Leibniz posits in every created monad is understood by him to be a mere defect or negation, and not something real and positive. Further, I argue that Leibniz’s talk of prime matter in every created monad is inspired by the thirteenth-century doctrine of spiritual matter, but that such talk is simply one way in which Leibniz frames a point that he frequently makes elsewhere—namely, that each creaturely essence incorporates a limitation that is the (...) ultimate source of an original imperfection that affects the creature from the first moment of its existence. (shrink)

This paper provides a philosophical analysis and a new edition of an anonymous Epitome of John Dumbleton’s solution to the semantic paradoxes. The first part of this paper briefly presents Dumbleton’s cassationist solution to the semantic paradoxes, which the English philosopher proposes in his Summa Logicae, written in the 1330s–40s. The second part investigates the solution to various types of insolubles proposed by the anonymous author of the Epitome. The third part provides a new critical edition of the Latin text (...) – a first edition was edited by Bottin in 1978 – and an English translation. (shrink)

Williamsonian modal epistemology is characterized by two commitments: realism about modality, and anti-exceptionalism about our modal knowledge. Williamson’s own counterfactual-based modal epistemology is the best known implementation of WME, but not the only option that is available. I sketch and defend an alternative implementation which takes our knowledge of metaphysical modality to arise, not from knowledge of counterfactuals, but from our knowledge of ordinary possibility statements of the form ‘x can F’. I defend this view against a criticism indicated in (...) Williamson’s own work, and argue that it is better connected to the semantics of modal language. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to sketch, with a broad brush and in bare outlines, an approach to modal epistemology that is characterized by three distinctive features. First, the approach is agency-based: it locates the roots of our modal thought and knowledge in our experience of our own agency. Second, the approach is ambitious in that it takes the experience of certain modal properties in agency to be the sole distinctive feature of specifically modal thought and knowledge; everything that (...) we know about modality beyond the experience of agency is a matter of applying standard methods of inquiry such as deduction, induction and abductive methods for choosing between theories. Third, the account holds that modal thought and knowledge is, first and foremost, about modal properties that are sufficiently like those encountered in agency. (shrink)

Título: Como os deuses chegaram até nós: por outras historiografias, sociologias, filosofias e antropologias Tema: Magia, Rituais, Mitos, Religião e Capitalismo: consonâncias, dissonâncias e relações com a Morte, um Ensaio. \ . \ -/- Protágoras de Abdera, nos diz que: “O homem é a medida de todas as coisas, das coisas que são, enquanto são, das coisas que não são, enquanto não são.” A isso Protágoras se referia sobre o homem como centro das coisas que vê, sente, percebe, reflete e (...) produz. Além de conter o relativismo, também contém o antropocentrismo. Ou seja, podemos dizer que o fogo queima, isso não é relativo, assim como a água molha e sacia a sede, bem como se não nos alimentarmos morreremos. Tais fatos não são relativos. Mas quando dizemos sobre sensações místicas, mágicas, percepções, noções e concepções ‘espirituais,’ ‘religiosas’ e com ‘deuses ou divindades,’ elas não são fatos absolutos em si, mas evidências relativas, pois cada pessoa vê, sente, percebe e reproduz sensações místicas de forma bem particular, pessoal e específica. Isso também em relação as manifestações religiosas e seus deuses. Já que são produtos culturais, sociais e de subjetividades. \ . -/- O trabalho em tela é um esforço de expor e contextualizar, as possíveis expressões das primeiras formas, modos e tipos de manifestações místicas, ritualísticas, mágicas, sacrificiais, de crenças e míticas nos processos sociais, culturais, econômicos, políticos e históricos das sociedades. Verificando assim, os primeiros fundamentos, processos e construções biopsicossociais, bem como suas produções e reproduções místicas e de crenças. Isso sendo verificado através e por meio dos povos considerados primitivos, antigos e arcaicos. Dessa forma, iremos realizar uma tentativa de reconstrução cronológica da formação e manifestação das primeiras práticas místicas, mágicas, ritualísticas e sacrificiais ao longo da história, e que vão culminar na formação das ‘religiões.’ Uma vez que, é justamente através e por meio das relações entre os povos, sociedades, culturas, civilizações e seus antropofagismos culturais, místicos, míticos, ritualísticos e de crenças, que se produzem outras manifestações e possíveis ‘religiões.’ Com isso, são nas relações e interações sociais entre as mesmas, integrando certos elementos, conteúdos, crenças etc., umas das outras, que as manifestações tidas como religiosas foram surgindo e se disseminando por inúmeros lugares. Logo, tais processos e manifestações não permaneceram estáticos, mas foram mudando e se transformando ao longo da história até a atualidade. E assim, a Magia, os Rituais, Mitos, sacrifícios e relações com a morte também foram se transformando e sendo ressignificados. Produzindo nos processos, diferenciações e transformações, certas dissonâncias, mas também mantendo certas consonâncias ou semelhanças. Entretanto, após a criação das religiões e suas relações com o Estado, sobretudo com o sistema capitalista, tais dissonâncias são bem mais evidentes. Também podemos dizer que o trabalho em tela, talvez seja uma exposição sumária dos desdobramentos dos processos ‘evolutivos,’ de desenvolvimentos, progressos e multiprodutos das inúmeras manifestações místicas, religiosas, culturais e de seus ‘deuses.’ ‘Evolutivos, progressos e desenvolvimentos aqui, diz apenas nos sentidos e aspectos das criações, produções, reelaborações e organizações criativas dos povos, sociedades e ou civilizações, suas culturas, misticismos e crenças. Sobretudo de suas divindades, magias, rituais e deuses. Porém, não havendo superiores ou inferiores entre nenhuma. Esta produção está sob óticas, análises e reflexões das áreas, campos e disciplinas da filosofia da história, filosofia das religiões, sociologia, psicologia e história das religiões, da antropologia cultural social e das religiões, da ciência das religiões, literatura e dentre outras. -/- . (shrink)

According to ecological psychology, animals perceive not just the qualities of things in their environment, but their affordances: in James Gibson’s words, ’what things furnish, for good or ill’. I propose a metaphysics for affordances that fits into a contemporary anti-Humean metaphysics of powers or potentialities. The goal is to connect two debates, one in the philosophy of perception and one in metaphysics, that stand to gain much from each other.

Modal dispositionalism is the view that possibilities are a matter of the dispositions of individual objects: it is possible that p if and only if something has a disposition for p to be the case. We raise a problem for modal dispositionalism: nothing within the theory rules out that there could be necessary, perfect masks, which make the manifestation of a disposition impossible. Unless such necessary perfect masks are ruled out, modal dispositionalism runs the risk of failing to provide a (...) sufficient condition for possibility, and indeed of engendering contradictions. But to rule them out, modal dispositionalism would have to revise a crucial tenet of the view, its localism. (shrink)

Dispositions are modal properties. The standard conception of dispositions holds that each disposition is individuated by its stimulus condition(s) and its manifestation(s), and that their modality is best captured by some conditional construction that relates stimulus to manifestation as antecedent to consequent. I propose an alternative conception of dispositions: each disposition is individuated by its manifestation alone, and its modality is closest to that of possibility — a fragile vase, for instance, is one that can break easily. The view is (...) expounded in some detail and defended against the major objections. (shrink)

Besides the better-known Nelson logic and paraconsistent Nelson logic, in 1959 David Nelson introduced, with motivations of realizability and constructibility, a logic called $\mathcal{S}$. The logic $\mathcal{S}$ was originally presented by means of a calculus with infinitely many rule schemata and no semantics. We look here at the propositional fragment of $\mathcal{S}$, showing that it is algebraizable, in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi, with respect to a variety of three-potent involutive residuated lattices. We thus introduce the first known algebraic (...) semantics for $\mathcal{S}$ as well as a finite Hilbert-style calculus equivalent to Nelson’s presentation; this also allows us to clarify the relation between $\mathcal{S}$ and the other two Nelson logics $\mathcal{N}3$ and $\mathcal{N}4$. (shrink)

Dispositionalists try to provide an account of modality—possibility, necessity, and the counterfactual conditional—in terms of dispositions. But there may be a tension between dispositionalist accounts of possibility on the one hand, and of counterfactuals on the other. Dispositionalists about possibility must hold that there are no impossible dispositions, i.e., dispositions with metaphysically impossible stimulus and/or manifestation conditions; dispositionalist accounts of counterfactuals, if they allow for non-vacuous counterpossibles, require that there are such impossible dispositions. I argue, first, that there are in (...) fact no impossible dispositions; and second, that the dispositionalist can nevertheless acknowledge the non-vacuity of some counterpossibles. The strategy in the second part is one of ‘divide and conquer’ that is not confined to the dispositionalist: it consists in arguing that counterpossibles, when non-vacuous, are read epistemically and are therefore outside the purview of a dispositional account. (shrink)

A cidade nas práticas artísticas [The city in artistic practices] is the result of the work developed, of the presentations and the debates held within the cycle of seminars “The experience of the city between art and philosophy”, held between 3 March 2020 and 16 June 2021 (calendar dramatically compromised by the challenges of the COVID 19 pandemic), one of the main activities of the OBRA project — Fragmentation and Reconfiguration: experiencing the city between art and philosophy, based at IFILNOVA (...) — Philosophy Institute of NOVA, in Lisbon. The book is divided into five parts, relating to each of the artistic disciplines to which the seminars were dedicated – cinema, photography, sound arts, literature and architecture —, which are edited by the organizers responsible for each of them — respectively, Susana Viegas, Humberto Brito, Nuno Fonseca João Oliveira Duarte and Susana Ventura — and composed of the respective narrated accounts of each seminar and of short essays, some merely textual, others graphical or even photographic, which are either in-depth versions of the reflections and positions that were presented and debated by the participants and guests, or works that motivated and inspired the work of the seminars. The seminar cycle and the book now presented here intend to reflect on the role of artistic practices in the representation and reconfiguration of urban experience, trying to understand their different attempts to apprehend and express the fragmentation of aesthetic experience in modern and contemporary cities, as well as to evaluate their contribution to an eventual symbolic and imaginative reconfiguration of that experience. Each section tries, in its own way, to answer questions such as: How do these arts think and reinvent the city? What do they make us feel? And what is their social and political role? For reasons that are easy to understand, Lisbon was the starting point, but other cities were also part of the journey. (shrink)

This paper explores the prospects for dispositional accounts of abilities. According to so-called new dispositionalists, an agent has the ability to Φ iff they have a disposition to Φ when trying to Φ. We show that the new dispositionalism is beset by some problems that also beset its predecessor, the conditional analysis of abilities, and bring up some further problems. We then turn to a different approach, which links abilities not to motivational states but to the notion of success, and (...) consider ways of implementing that approach. Our results suggest that there are principled disanalogies between abilities and disposition which prevent any dispositional account of abilities from succeeding. (shrink)

Muito se ouve falar em cidadão, ser cidadão, direitos e deveres do cidadão, bem como atuar ativamente enquanto cidadão. Porém, inúmeras pessoas ignoram esse tão complexo, profundo e importante termo. Saber sua origem, etimologia, sentido e significados são de suma importância para os sujeitos que fazem parte de uma estrutura, sistema e conjuntura social que abarca os indivíduos como seus cidadãos. Desse modo, o presente trabalho busca uma compreensão mais aprofundada do que é cidadão, ser cidadão, sua origem, ativação e (...) a efetividade prática de tal conceito na realidade social, política, econômica e histórica, uma vez que, o conceito ou termo deriva de origens longínquas e como construto e produção humana no social, não veio do acaso, mas através e por meio da racionalidade, experiências, processos, vivencias e percepções diante das relações sociais, políticas, econômicas e históricas. Logo, nos foi necessário realizar procedimentos e movimentos historiográficos e de filosofia da linguagem, indo a Grécia e Roma Antigas, no qual foram configurando o termo em suas origens e legando para as posteridades, inclusive para nós brasileiros. Sendo assim, fizemos o esforço de buscar as origens do termo, conceito e aplicabilidade no social partindo brevemente da Grécia e Roma Antiga, e relacionando-o com a realidade e aspectos da linguagem, inclusive sua relação com o processo contemporâneo, no qual nos movem a indagar quais problemas envolvem o termo, prática, direitos do cidadão e ou ser cidadão, onde surgem questões também como se há algum problema de semântica, de conceito, falta de entendimento do termo ou uma economia da concretude e aplicabilidade. Bem como, se há cidadãos de primeira, segunda e terceira categoria. Anacronismos ou resgates dos significados e sentidos? E o que dizer da exclusão das mulheres, negros, indígenas, crianças e outros da investidura como cidadãos? Logo, o trabalho em tela é de ordem Bibliográfica, de Revisão da Literatura e abarcando áreas, elementos, instrumentos e aspectos da historiografia, filosofia da linguagem, análises do discurso, sociologia e da antropologia social e cultural. (shrink)

Diante dos embates e dilemas que vive o Brasil após o ano de 2016, fundamentalmente no que diz respeito a educação pública brasileira, o presente trabalho procurou se debruçar, refletir e verificar a posição e situação do educando brasileiro no cenário social nacional, e sobretudo escolar. Levamos em conta como base de configuração do indivíduo-sujeito e estudante sua identidade enquanto ser biopsicossocial, isso na perspectiva Aristotélica e Marxista de homem, tanto como ser dotado de razão, emoção, vontade, social, político, teleológico (...) (Aristóteles) e essencialmente ser de trabalho e histórico (Marx). (shrink)

Duas das principais controvérsias que têm ocupado aqueles que se dedicam à teoria aris- totélica do movimento animal são a controvérsia acerca da forma da cognição através da qual um animal irracional apreende um objeto como um objeto de desejo e a controvérsia acerca da função desempenhada pela cognição na explicação aristotélica dos movimentos voluntários de locomoção animal. Neste artigo, eu apresento uma teoria acerca das formas como o desejo e a cognição se articulam na teoria aristotélica segundo a qual (...) um animal irracional apreende um objeto como um objeto de desejo através da percepção incidental deste objeto e, ao contrário do que a maioria parece acreditar, esta percepção não tem sempre a mesma função na produção destes movimentos. Se o que for dito aqui estiver correto, em alguns casos esta percepção é responsável tanto pela geração do desejo quan- to pela sua orientação, mas em outros ela é responsável apenas pela sua orientação. (shrink)

It is a familiar point that many ordinary dispositions are multi-track, that is, not fully and adequately characterisable by a single conditional. In this paper, I argue that both the extent and the implications of this point have been severely underestimated. First, I provide new arguments to show that every disposition whose stimulus condition is a determinable quantity must be infinitely multi-track. Secondly, I argue that this result should incline us to move away from the standard assumption that dispositions are (...) in some way importantly linked to conditionals, as presupposed by the debate about various versions of the ‘conditional analysis’ of dispositions. I introduce an alternative conception of dispositionality, which is motivated by linguistic observations about dispositional adjectives and links dispositions to possibility instead of conditionals. I argue that, because of the multi-track nature of dispositions, the possibility-based conception of dispositions is to be preferred. (shrink)

Dispositionalism about modality is the view that metaphysical modality is a matter of the dispositions possessed by actual objects. In a recent paper, David Yates has raised an important worry about the formal adequacy of dispositionalism. This paper responds to Yates’s worry by developing a reply that Yates discusses briefly but dismisses as ad hoc: an appeal to a ’plenitude of powers’ including such powers as the necessarily always manifested power for 2+2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} (...) \begin{document}$$2+2$$\end{document} to be 4. I argue that the reply is not ad hoc at all, by defending the metaphysics of dispositions that should underly it. I then argue, first, that a proper understanding of dispositions’ degrees provides us with an argument for such necessarily always manifested dispositions; second, that all the natural attempts to block that argument can be resisted without being ad hoc; and third, that pragmatic considerations explain our intuitive resistance to the ascription of necessarily always manifested dispositions. Dispositionalism can be formally adequate after all. (shrink)

O objetivo central desta pesquisa é comparar as credenciais epistêmicas da crença em Deus na epistemologia religiosa de dois dos principais pensadores da filosofia analítica da religião contemporânea: Alvin Plantinga (1932- ) e Richard Swinburne (1934- ). Mais precisamente, busca-se investigar como a crença na existência de Deus pode obter status epistêmico positivo, ou seja, como pode ser intelectualmente justificada ou racional ou ainda avalizada, a partir de comparações, contrastes ou complementações que podem ser feitos entre as propostas dos dois (...) filósofos. Deste modo, será avaliado como Plantinga e Swinburne lidam com algumas questões fundamentais da filosofia analítica da religião ligadas à natureza e à relação entre fé e razão. Para que tal objetivo seja concretizado, foram escolhidos três méritos ou credenciais epistêmicas: a justificação deontológica, a racionalidade e o aval. Na primeira parte desta tese, serão clarificados os conceitos fundamentais ligados ao debate sobre a relação entre fé e razão na filosofia analítica contemporânea a fim de elucidar o problema central desta pesquisa; além disso, será esclarecido o que significa precisamente uma crença ter o mérito da justificação, da racionalidade ou do aval. Na segunda parte, são apresentadas as duas propostas epistemológicas que serão comparadas, a saber, a Epistemologia Reformada de Alvin Plantinga e o balanço evidencial probabilístico proposto pela teologia natural de Richard Swinburne. Por fim, visa-se comparar criticamente as duas propostas e analisar a possibilidade de articulação entre essas duas diferentes abordagens. (shrink)

Conto: Sabiá, Percevejo, Bacalhau, Ratão e Esculápia: Histórias, Memórias, Filosofias e Psicanálises.....\.....|.|... || Alberto Raimundo Francisco de Souza e outros...\|......|| || ‘As portas da escuridão vão serem abertas.’ || A vida, a Existência e o Viver são repletos de mistérios. Pessoas se encontram e se desencontram durante a jornada da vida, e em seus caminhos e trajetórias. Sorrimos e choramos. Mas tudo faz parte do movimento e do fluir da Vida. Sabiá, Percevejo, Bacalhau e Ratão estavam a busca de algo (...) perdido, talvez já encontrado e ainda não compreendido. Ambos com seus dilemas, conflitos, complexos e crises, isso diante, com e nas relações sociais tão problemáticas e suas contradições. Entretanto, durante o encontro desses quatro sujeitos com uma estranha criatura, a Esculápia ou Asclépia, tanto faz, esse é o nome dela, os quatro desconhecidos que estão a travar uma longa discussão, sobre muitos assuntos polêmicos da vida, bem como de si mesmos, irão fazer movimentos catárticos e de descobertas, e que os impactará para sempre. || ‘Certamente, em algum dia, alguma vez e em algum momento, você também já se perguntou: o que eu tenho que fazer aqui? Qual é o meu propósito aqui? O que eu vim fazer nesse mundo? E as vezes não existe nenhuma resposta que queiras realmente ouvir, pois há de ser que, talvez, nenhuma seja a certa ou conclusiva.’ || ‘Se ver através e por meio do outro, ou dos outros, são uma das qualidades mais raras que existem na espécie humana, porém, talvez poucos ainda a descobriram, e talvez menos ainda, a exerçam no seu cotidiano.’ || ‘A vida e o viver, contém e estão repletos, talvez cheios de seus mistérios, mistérios revelados e outros ocultos, esperando apenas a serem descobertos, e tão logo, revelados a você.’. (shrink)

Manley and Wasserman (2008) have provided a convincing case against analyses of dispositions in terms of one conditional, and a very interesting positive proposal that links any disposition to a ‘suitable proportion’ of a particular set of precise conditionals. I focus on their positive proposal and ask just how precise those conditionals are to be. I argue that, contrary to what Manley and Wasserman imply in their paper, they must be maximally specific, describing in their antecedents complete centred worlds. This (...) suggests a natural semantics for dispositional expressions, which I briefly explore to argue that it lacks uniformity. I end by suggesting a variation on Manley and Wasserman's view which would preserve uniformity, though at the cost of some new puzzling questions. (shrink)

This paper surveys recent "new actualist" approaches to modality that do without possible worlds and locate modality squarely in the actual world. New actualist theories include essentialism and dispositionalism about modality, each of which can come in different varieties. The commonalities and differences between these views, as well as their shared motivations, are layed out.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo verificar como educandos da Rede Pública de ensino do Município de Niterói/RJ percebem o fenômeno da violência nas suas comunidades e como esta percepção se evidencia em seus discursos. Para isso foi aplicado um questionário semiestruturado com questões objetivas e uma discursiva, no qual foi respondido por 120 estudantes com idades entre 13 e 17 anos da Rede Estadual de Ensino de escolas da Zona Norte de Niterói, estado do Rio de Janeiro. As respostas às (...) questões objetivas foram analisadas quantitativamente e à questão discursiva por meio de técnica categorial, onde as categorias eram os itens escolhidos nas respostas dos estudantes. As questões discursivas foram analisadas qualitativamente, gerando uma análise quanti-qualitativa. Verificamos também resultados de pesquisas análogas, e a discussão foi construída à luz dos teóricos Albert Bandura, Michel Foucault e Lev Vygotsky, no qual se mostrou que nossos dados são suportados pela literatura. (shrink)

In May 2021, Royal Dutch Shell was ordered by the Hague District Court to significantly reduce its CO2 emissions. This ruling is unprecedented in that it attributes the responsibility for mitigating climate change directly to a specific corporate emitter. Shell neither directly causes climate change alone nor can alleviate it by itself; therefore, what grounds this responsibility attribution? I maintain that this question can be answered via Young’s social connection model of responsibility for justice. I defend two claims: First, I (...) argue that the model explains Shell’s connection to climate change and that this relationship grounds Shell’s responsibility. Second, by identifying a way in which the social connection model could be applied to corporations in legal practice, I further develop Young’s model. I question Young’s distinction between political and legal responsibility for justice and propose that courts could mediate citizens’ actions regarding political responsibilities. (shrink)

It's well known that Leibniz characterizes bodies in two apparently incompatible ways. On the one hand, he asserts that a body is a real or well-founded phenomenon; on the other, he claims that a body is an aggregate of substances that possesses the reality of these same substances. In this essay I aim to defend an explanation of the relation that exists, according to Leibniz, between these two conceptions of body, an explanation that shows them to be compatible and, indeed, (...) complementary. In the first part of this paper I aim above all to show that Robert Adams and Donald Rutherford are wrong to think that these two conceptions are to be reconciled by recognizing that for Leibniz they apply to one and the same thing. (shrink)

Alexander Bird puts forward a modest version of anti-Humeanism about the non-fundamental, by providing an argument for the existence of a certain select class of non-fundamental but sparse dispositions: those that have an evolutionary function. I argue that his argument over-generates, so much so that the sparse–abundant distinction, and with it the tenet of his anti-Humean view, becomes obsolete. I suggest an alternative way of understanding anti-Humeanism in the non-fundamental realm, one which is not concerned with the existence of sparse (...) properties but with explanatory relations. (shrink)

Richard Rorty's rejection of prevailing interior-mirror understandings of the presumed relationship between “minds” and “nature,” along with his promotion of nonrepresentational accounts of knowledge, truth, and science, participates in a rich tradition of jointly pragmatist and constructivist views that spans the twentieth century. This contribution to the symposium “Whatever Happened to Richard Rorty?” considers Rorty's complex and ambivalent relation to that tradition, particularly to the work of his American pragmatist predecessors, William James and John Dewey, and to subsequent pragmatist-constructivist antirepresentationalism (...) in contemporary science and technology studies (STS) and “4E” (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognitive theory. A final section on Nicholas Gaskill's contribution to the symposium questions his sense of Rorty's rhetorical recklessness and suggests that his worries over relativism, in Rorty's texts and more generally, are misplaced. (shrink)

Este artigo consiste em abordagem de cunho introdutório sobre a crítica à metafísica. Destacam-se elementos isolados do conteúdo de crítica à metafísica na modernidade e que tende a vir a ser desenvolvido na contemporaneidade. Com isso quer-se dizer que na passagem da modernidade para a contemporaneidade a filosofia acaba por incorporar o conteúdo de crítica à metafísica e evolui na direção de vir a reconhecer sua condição de ser metafísica e de empreender crítica a essa condição. Para estabelecer a abordagem (...) do assunto procura-se aqui manter subjacente a ideia de crítica à metafísica no contexto da história da filosofia; mas é priorizado nisso o aspecto temático em vez de seu aspecto histórico. Busca-se mostrar que no processo de compreender a crítica à metafísica tem ocorrido de se tentar apartar do caráter de metafísico o caráter de teórico da ciência. Requer então indagar se é possível estabelecer marco de separação entre uma coisa e a outra. Em vez de separação opta-se aqui por investir no conhecimento da identidade da própria metafísica como saber filosófico; busca-se esclarecer que a pergunta pelo que é filosofia e a dificuldade de compreender o seu conteúdo é o que traz à tona a crítica à metafísica e a torna necessária, mas como modo de se compreender melhor o que é filosofia. (shrink)

In this thesis, I develop a nonreductive and general conception of potentiality, and explore the prospects of a realist account of possibility based on this account of potentiality. Potentialities are properties of individual objects; they include dispositions such as fragility and abilities such as the ability to play the piano. Potentialities are individuated by their manifestation alone. In order to provide a unified account of potentialities, I argue in chapter 2 that dispositions, contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, are best understood in (...) terms only of their manifestations (as disposi- tions to ...), rather than in terms of a stimulus and a manifestation condition (as dispositions to ... if ...). Chapter 3 provides some preliminary motivation for a nonreductive and gen- eral account of potentiality, and chapter 4 develops such an account. The guiding question is how far the notion of potentiality can be extended from the initial ex- amples of familiar dispositions and abilities, and it is argued that it can be extended very far. Various features of potentialities are explored, among them extrinsicality, iterations of potentiality, and the behaviour of potentiality with regard to logical equivalence. In chapter 5, the account is set to work in providing the outlines and a defense of a potentiality-based account of possibility. The basic idea of such an account is that it is possible that p just in case some thing has a potentiality for p. The account is defended against the objection that there may not be enough potential- ities to ground all the possibilities that there are. Finally, in chapter 6, a logic of potentiality is formulated and the logic of possibility derived from it, showing that the potentiality-based account of possibility is formally adequate: it provides pos- sibility with the formal features that modal logicians have studied. I conclude that the proposed account of possibility is a promising research programme. (shrink)

In this article, I present an interpretation of Aristotle’s thought regarding the normative value of friendship duties.The argument is divided in VII sections. In Section I, I provide brief summaries of the main arguments defended by me in a previous article about the normative consequences of virtue and utility friendships in Aristotle, the objectives that are to be defended in this article and of the conclusions that I take them to support. In section II, I offer an interpretation of Aristotle’s (...) thought regarding the normative value of friendship duties in cases where there is no practical conflict between friendship duties. In section III, I outline Aristotle’s theory about how we should deal with cases where there is such practical conflict. In the next sections, I analyze three other passages of the Aristotelian corpus where we have good reason to think that this kind of conflict appears, namely, NE, III 1, 1110a20-29 (IV), Pol., III 10, 1286b23-28 (V) and Pol., VII 9, 1330a9-25 (VI), in order to flesh out the outline presented in section III. In section VII I conclude with a summary of the argument. (shrink)